This link has been bookmarked by 3 people . It was first bookmarked on 19 Jul 2006, by Sam.
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22 Nov 11
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Nowhere does this notion seem more apt than in the former Yugoslavia.
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Let us return to those two most unsettling cases, Rwanda and the Balkans.
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In 199091 Habyarimana began to assemble armed gangs into a militia called Interahamwe
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1993 began systematically to kill Hutu moderates and Tutsis
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that ethnic diversity brings with it political instability and the likelihood of violence.
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third mistaken assumption
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ome of the world's most ethnically diverse states, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan, t
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Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda) have had the bloodiest such conflicts
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Why do some countries succeed at meeting those challenges while others fail? Two sets of reasons
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First there are the "raw materials" for social peace that countries possess at the time of independence
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Countries in which one group has been exploiting all others (such as Rwanda and Burundi)
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while countries with no such clearly dominating group (such as Indonesia)
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t Malaysia has largely managed to avoid it while Sri Lanka has not. The crucial difference, writes Horowitz, was in the emerging political systems in the two countries. Malaysian politicians constru
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Sri Lanka, as we s
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But political systems can be changed. Nigeria is a good example
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A similar direction has been pursued by Kenya's Daniel arap Moi, who has created an ethnic electoral base that excludes most Kikuyus,
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What the myth of ethnic conflict would say are ever-present tensions are in fact the products of political choices
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It makes violence seem characteristic of a people or region, rather than the consequence of specific political acts.
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Because it paints all sides as less rational and less modern (
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it distracts us from the central and difficult question of just how and why people are sometimes led to commit such horrifying deeds.
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17 Nov 10
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ethnic identities are ancient and unchanging
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ancient tribal hatreds
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What the African official had to say was right: ethnic thinking in political life is a product of modern conflicts over power and resources, and not an ancient impediment to political modernity
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even instituted a minimum height requirement for entrance to college.
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n the late 1950s Hutus began to rebel against Tutsi rule (encouraged by Europeans on their way out) and then created an independent and Hutu-dominated [End Page 6] state in Rwanda; this state then gave rise to Tutsi resentments and to the creation of a Tutsi rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front.
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19 Jul 06
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Much recent discussion of international affairs has been based on the misleading assumption that the world is fraught with primordial ethnic conflict.
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They all share, however, the idea that the world's current conflicts are fueled by age-old ethnic loyalties and cultural differences.
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This notion misrepresents the genesis of conflict and ignores the ability of diverse people to coexist. The very phrase "ethnic conflict" misguides us. It has become a shorthand way to speak about any and all violent confrontations between groups of people living in the same country. Some of these conflicts involve ethnic or cultural identity, but most are about getting more power, land, or other resources. They do not result from ethnic diversity; thinking that they do sends us off in pursuit of the wrong policies, tolerating rulers who incite riots and suppress ethnic differences.
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In speaking about local group conflicts we tend to make three assumptions: first, that ethnic identities are ancient and unchanging; second, that these identities motivate people to persecute and kill; and third, that ethnic diversity itself inevitably leads to violence. All three are mistaken.
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Contrary to the first assumption, ethnicity is a product of modern politics.
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Although people have had identities--deriving from religion, birthplace, language, and so on--for as long as humans have had culture, they have begun to see themselves as members of vast ethnic groups, opposed to other such groups, only during the modern period of colonization and state-building
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The view that ethnicity is ancient and unchanging emerges these days in the potent images of the cauldron and the tribe. Out of the violence in Eastern Europe came images of the region as a bubbling cauldron of ethnonationalist sentiments that were sure to boil over unless suppressed by strong states.
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Nowhere does this notion seem more apt than in the former Yugoslavia.
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Surely the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians are distinct ethnic groups destined to clash throughout history, are they not? Yet it is often forgotten how small the differences are among the currently warring factions in the Balkans. Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians all speak the same language (Italy has greater linguistic diversity) and have lived side by side, most often in peace, for centuries. Although it is common to say that they are separated by religion--Croats being Roman Catholic, Serbs Orthodox Christian, and Bosnians Muslim--in fact each population includes sizeable numbers of the other two religions. The three religions have indeed become symbols of group differences, but religious differences have not, by themselves, caused intergroup conflict. Rising rates of intermarriage (as high as 30 percent in Bosnia) would have led to the gradual blurring of contrasts across these lines.
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the roots of the current Balkan violence lie not in primordial ethnic and religious differences but rather in modern attempts to rally people around nationalist ideas.
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"Ethnicity" becomes "nationalism" when it includes aspirations to gain a monopoly of land, resources, and power. But nationalism, too, is a learned and frequently manipulated set of ideas, and not a primordial sentiment.
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ethnic thinking in political life is a product of modern conflicts over power and resources, and not an ancient impediment to political modernity.
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It was the colonial powers, and the independent states succeeding them, which declared that each and every person had an "ethnic identity" that determined his or her place within the colony or the postcolonial system. Even such a seemingly small event as the taking of a census created the idea of a colony-wide ethnic category to which one belonged and had loyalties. (And this was not the case just in Africa: some historians of India attribute the birth of Hindu nationalism to the first British census, when people began to think of themselves as members of Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh populations.) The colonial powers--Belgians, Germans, French, British, and Dutch--also realized that, given their small numbers in their dominions, they could effectively govern and exploit only by seeking out "partners" from among local people, sometimes from minority or Christianized groups. But then the state had to separate its partners from all others, thereby creating firmly bounded "ethnic groups."
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Sri Lanka
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Rwanda and Burundi
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A reader might say at this point: Fine, ethnic identities are modern and created, but today people surely do target members of other ethnic [End Page 7] groups for violence, do they not? The answer is: Less than we usually think, and when they do, it is only after a long period of being prepared, pushed, and threatened by leaders who control the army and the airwaves. It is fear and hate generated from the top, and not ethnic differences, that finally push people to commit acts of violence. People may come to fear or resent another group for a variety of reasons, especially when social and economic change seems to favor the other group. And yet such competition and resentment "at the ground level" usually does not lead to intergroup violence without an intervening push from the top.
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Rwanda and the Balkans
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Indonesians
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Rwandan
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Serbs
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Kosovo
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Croats
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This brings us to the third mistaken assumption: that ethnic diversity brings with it political instability and the likelihood of violence. To the contrary, greater ethnic diversity is not associated with greater interethnic conflict. Some of the world's most ethnically diverse states, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan, though not without internal conflict and political repression, have suffered little interethnic violence, while countries with very slight differences in language or culture (the former [End Page 10] Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda) have had the bloodiest such conflicts. It is the number of ethnic groups and their relationships to power, not diversity per se, that strongly affect political stability.
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Indonesia
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f Indonesia, it is
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What the myth of ethnic conflict would say are ever-present tensions are in fact the products of political choices. Negative stereotyping, fear of another group, killing lest one be killed--these are the doings of so-called leaders, and can be undone by them as well. Believing otherwise, and assuming that such conflicts are the natural consequences of human depravity in some quarters of the world, leads to perverse thinking and perverse policy. It makes violence seem characteristic of a people or region, rather than the consequence of specific political acts. Thinking this way excuses inaction, as when U.S. president Bill Clinton, seeking to retreat from the hard-line Balkan policy of candidate Clinton, began to claim that Bosnians and Serbs were killing each other because of their ethnic and religious differences. Because it paints all sides as less rational and less modern (more tribal, more ethnic) than "we" are, it makes it easier to tolerate their suffering. Because it assumes that "those people" would naturally follow their leaders' call to kill, it distracts us from the central and difficult question of just how and why people are sometimes led to commit such horrifying deeds.
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Nigeria
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second set of reasons for social peace or social conflict. States do make choices, particularly about political processes, that ease or exacerbate intergroup tensions. As political scientist Donald Horowitz has pointed out, if we consider only their starting conditions, Malaysia ought to have experienced considerable interethnic violence (for the reasons given above), whereas Sri Lanka, where Tamils and Sinhalese had mingled in the British-trained elite, should have been spared such violence. And yet Malaysia has largely managed to avoid it while Sri Lanka has not. The crucial difference, writes Horowitz, was in the emerging political systems in the two countries. Malaysian politicians constructed a multiethnic political coalition, which fostered ties between Chinese and Malay leaders and forced political candidates to seek the large middle electoral ground. In Sri Lanka, as we saw earlier, Sinhalese-speakers formed a chauvinist nationalist movement, and after early cooperation Tamils and Sinhalese split apart to form ethnically based political parties. Extreme factions appeared on the wings of each party, forcing party leaders to drift in their directions.
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olonial Indonesia
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Cultural diversity does, of course, present challenges to national integration and social peace. Why do some countries succeed at meeting those challenges while others fail? Two sets of reasons seem most important, and they swamp the mere fact of ethnic and cultural diversity.
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Indonesia
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First there are the "raw materials" for social peace that countries possess at the time of independence. Countries in which one group has been exploiting all others (such as Rwanda and Burundi) start off with scores to settle, while countries with no such clearly dominating group (such as Indonesia) have an initial advantage in building political consensus. So-called centralized polities, with two or three large groups that continually polarize national politics, are less stable than "dispersed" systems, in which each of many smaller groups is forced to seek out allies to achieve its goals. And if the major ethnic groups share a language or religion, or if they have worked together in a revolutionary struggle, they have a bridge already in place that they can use to build political cooperation.
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of Indonesia.
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