This link has been bookmarked by 22 people . It was first bookmarked on 21 Mar 2007, by Mr Maher.
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01 May 13
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Part 1: Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine
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Part 2: Background of Outlook
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To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries.
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In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it.
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This is why Soviet purposes most always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs
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Part 3: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level
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Part 4: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts no Responsibility
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Part 5: [Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy]
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Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.
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07 Sep 12
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23 May 12
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511. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:
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I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows
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22 May 12
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861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram
The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
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I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification.
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(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.
(2) Background of this outlook
(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.
(4) Its projection on unofficial level.
(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy
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USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence
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there will emerge two centers of world significance:
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Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world."
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Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter
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Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.
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from standpoint of Soviet policy?
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advance relative strength of USSR
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reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers
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Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible.
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Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world.
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There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world.
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We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?
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Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state:
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Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power.
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Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others.
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I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.
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Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy,
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directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations
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a vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration.
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nternational economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together
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underlying policy
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I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet's own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations
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Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.
(h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called "correct" course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol as distinct from good manners
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they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow.
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09 Apr 12
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30 Oct 11
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03 Mar 11
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antagonistic "capitalist encirclement"
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no permanent peaceful coexistence
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from standpoint of Soviet policy
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advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society
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Soviet efforts
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toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers
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At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity
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as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area
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Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries.
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feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within
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security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.
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Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks
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justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand
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Soviet purposes most always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism
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Soviet leaders are driven [by?] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final Coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world
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It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe
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nternal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.
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efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power
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Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others
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Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense Strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power
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On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers of [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred
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Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (
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with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted,
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elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries
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it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point.
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Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so
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Soviets are still by far the weaker force
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We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation
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World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue.
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They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this
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13 Feb 11
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16 Jan 11
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05 Nov 10
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Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so
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Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so.
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Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so.
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Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so
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Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so
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Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so
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Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so
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Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so
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Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so
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Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so
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03 Aug 10
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17 Nov 09
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"In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world.
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Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.
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19 Nov 08
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15 Oct 07
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07 Oct 07
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21 Mar 07
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21 Feb 06
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