This link has been bookmarked by 1 people . It was first bookmarked on 11 Dec 2007, by Dan Moore.
-
11 Dec 07
-
We should like to show here that the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world. It is a being of the world, like the ego of another
-
No more is needed in the way of a philosophical foundation for an ethics and a politics which are absolutely positive
-
the relation of interdependence established by this absolute consciousness between the me and the World is sufficient for the me to appear as "endangered" before the World, for the me (indirectly and through the intermediary of states) to draw the whole of its content from the World
-
quite simply a first condition and an absolute source of existence
-
no longer a collection of representations
-
This absolute consciousness, when it is purified of the I, no longer has anything of the subject
-
The World has not created the me; the me has not created the World
-
is enough that the me be contemporaneous with the World, and that the subject-object duality, which is purely logical, definitively disappear from philosophical preoccupations
-
not necessary that the object precede the subject for spiritual pseudo-values to vanish and for ethics to find its bases in reality
-
has always seemed to me that a working hypothesis as fruitful as historical materialism never needed for a foundation the absurdity which is metaphysical materialism
-
Unfortunately, as long as the I remains a structure of absolute consciousness, one will still be able to reproach phenomenology for being an escapist doctrine, for again pulling a part of man out of the world and, in that way, turning our attention from the real problems. It seems to us that this reproach no longer has any justification if one makes the me an existent, strictly contemporaneous with the world, whose existence has the same essential characteristics as the world
-
The phenomenologists have plunged man back into the world; they have given full measure to man's agonies and sufferings, and also to his rebellions
-
Instead of expressing itself in effect as "I alone exist as absolute," it must assert that "absolute consciousness alone exists as absolute," which is obviously a truism. My I, in effect, is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more intimate
-
But if the I becomes a transcendent, it participates in all the vicissitudes of the world. It is no absolute; it has not created the uuniverse; it falls like other existences at the stroke of the epoch [epoché]; and solipsism becomes unthinkable from the moment that the I no longer has a priveledged status
-
Would you like to comment?
Join Diigo for a free account, or sign in if you are already a member.