This link has been bookmarked by 3 people . It was first bookmarked on 28 Mar 2007, by Lindsay Ahalt.
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27 May 13
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1. God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies.
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that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time
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1. God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies.
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determinate
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Finite spirits
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Principium
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Individuationis.
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which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind.
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brutes
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For example, what is a watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization or construction of parts to a certain end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain.
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6. The identity of man
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This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists; viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body.
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preserved in something else than identity of substance;
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transmigration
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into the bodies of beasts,
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detruded
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with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations.
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Heliogabalus
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aright
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if person, man, and substance, are three names standing for three different ideas;
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ingenious
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chaplains,
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He said, with his usual plainness and dryness in talk, there was something true, but a great deal false of what had been reported.
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Some General or other.
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digressions
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vouches
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if this parrot, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word for it this one did,- whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of rational animals; but yet, whether, for all that, they would have been allowed to be men, and not parrots?
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premised
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we must consider what person stands for;- which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places;
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which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.
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But it is further inquired, whether it be the same identical substance.
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The question being what makes the same person;
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annexed
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and with the same consciousness it has of any present action;
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whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self,
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Whether if the same substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person; or, remaining the same, it can be different persons?
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brutes
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Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.
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Whether in change of thinking substances there can be one person.
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if the same consciousness (which, as has been shown, is quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved.
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Whether, the same immaterial substance remaining, there can be two persons.
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Nestor
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The body, as well as the soul, goes to the making of a man
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to conceive the same person at the resurrection
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cobbler
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The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I guess, to everybody determine the man in this case, wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the same cobbler to every one besides himself.
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I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the same person, and the same man, stand for one and the same thing.
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Consciousness alone unites actions into the same person
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deluge
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Self is that conscious thinking thing,
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Self depends on consciousness, not on substance.
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as far as that consciousness reaches, and no further; as every one who reflects will perceive.
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Persons, not substances, the objects of reward and punishment.
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not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the identity of consciousness,
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if the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person.
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And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen.
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oblivion
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that we must here take notice what the word I is applied to;
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which, in this case, is the man only.
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But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons;
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Difference between identity of man and of person.
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we must consider what is meant by Socrates, or the same individual man.
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First, it must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking substance
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For, by the first of them, it must be allowed possible that a man born of different women, and in distant times, may be the same man.
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the same man to be two distinct persons,
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how they will make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after the resurrection.
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annexed
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But in the Great Day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of, but shall receive his doom, his conscience accusing or excusing him.
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Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day, the other by night; and, on the other side, the same consciousness, acting by intervals, two distinct bodies:
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25. Consciousness unites substances, material or spiritual, with the same personality.
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and therefore it is possible may exist,
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numerical substance
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"Person" a forensic term.
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demerit
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at the great day, when every one shall "receive according to his doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open." The sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have, that they themselves, in what bodies soever they appear,
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Suppositions that look strange are pardonable in our ignorance.
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Whatever substance begins to exist, it must, during its existence, necessarily be the same:
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whilst that rational spirit
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28 Mar 07
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