This link has been bookmarked by 4 people . It was first bookmarked on 07 Apr 2009, by someone privately.
-
20 Jan 14
-
In the Pike case, the Court explained that a state regulation having only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 397 U.S. at 142, 90 S.Ct. at 847. When weighing burdens against benefits, a court should consider both "the nature of the local interest involved, and ... whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." Id. Thus regulation designed to implement public health and safety, or serve other legitimate state interests, but impact interstate commerce as an incident to that purpose, are subject to a test akin to the rational basis test, a minimum level of scruti
-
-
10 May 11
-
Thus, in a Dormant Commerce Clause case, a court is initially concerned with whether the law facially discriminates against out-of-state actors or has the effect of favoring in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests. Discriminatory laws motivated by "simple economic protectionism" are subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity," City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey 437 U.S. 617 (1978), Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333 (1977) which can only be overcome by a showing that the State has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose, Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131(1986). See also Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
-
On the other hand, when a law is "directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental" (United Haulers Association, Inc.), that is, where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach, the general contours of which were outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) and City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624. If the law is not outright or intentionally discriminatory or protectionist, but still has some impact on interstate commerce, the court will evaluate the law using a balancing test. The Court determines whether the interstate burden imposed by a law outweighs the local benefits. If such is the case, the law is usually deemed unconstitutional. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In the Pike case, the Court explained that a state regulation having only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 397 U.S. at 142, 90 S.Ct. at 847. When weighing burdens against benefits, a court should consider both "the nature of the local interest involved, and ... whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." Id.
-
-
23 Apr 09
-
Dormant Commerce Clause
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search<!-- start content -->The “Dormant” Commerce Clause, also known as the “Negative” Commerce Clause, is a legal doctrine that courts in the United States have inferred from the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power to enact legislation that affects interstate commerce. The idea behind the Dormant Commerce Clause is that this grant of power implies a negative converse — a restriction prohibiting a state from passing legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. The restriction is self-executing and applies even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute.
The premise of the doctrine is that the U.S. Constitution reserves for the United States Congress at least some degree of exclusive power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes" (Article I, § 8). Therefore, individual states are limited in their ability to legislate on such matters. The Dormant Commerce Clause does not expressly exist in the text of the United States Constitution. It is, rather, a doctrine deduced by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts from the actual Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Justice O'Connor has written that: The central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent. See The Federalist No. 22, pp. 143-145 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 2 Writings of James Madison 362-363 (G. Hunt ed. 1901).
-
Would you like to comment?
Join Diigo for a free account, or sign in if you are already a member.