The first and most obvious question should be whether constant analogies to nuclear warfare and Cold War-era deterrence are helpful or harmful.
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22 May 09
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U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is located. One of the command’s jobs is shaping a strategy that prevents such a cyber attack from happening. Parsing conflicts in terms of deterrence – making the price of an attack so believably high to potential attackers that their cost-benefit ratio is negative – comes naturally to STRATCOM. It commanded America’s land-based strategic bomber aircraft and land-based intercontinental ballistic missile nuclear arsenal for the duration of the Cold War.
Back then the rules coalesced into fairly clear lines. Now the command is faced with an array of questions for which there are no easy answers
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“Can we determine first of all that we are being attacked?” asked Air Force Brig. Gen Susan Helms, STRATCOM’s director of plans and policy. “How will we differentiate between that, and let’s say, a system failure?”
Other questions include: How can anyone be sure where the attack is coming from? It’s difficult in the cyber world to attribute where an attack originates from with certainty. Also, might third party countries be stirring up apparent attacks in an effort to channel a U.S. response toward an apparent aggressor?
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So, basically, we have no idea who is attacking us, but we're sure as hell going to keep physical force response, including nukes, on the table anyway!
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Add Sticky NoteThen there are questions about the nature of American response – do cyber attacks require a cyber response, or should the president order a live weapon reply? At what point does the threat of a kinetic attack become unbelievable? Might that leave a gap in a potential adversary exploit, frustrating U.S. resolution until there’s nothing left?
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The answer in the UN Charter as interpreted by most scholars of international law is that the attack must lead to physical world damage, destruction, injury or loss of life before Article 51 could be invoked. From what I can tell, it's pretty straight forward. Framing all of this as though it is entirely new, posing questions to which we have no ideas about the answers, seems part of a strategy to purposefully create a new "domain of warfare." And on the issue of levels of force...the threat of kinetic attack loses credibility when it is a threat of nuclear reply, a threat that the U.S. has not taken off the table. It's both in-credible and immoral.
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Add Sticky Note“Does it matter if it’s an attack on the economy, where there’s little physical damage, there’s just disruption?” asked a STRATCOM official who requested to remain anonymous.
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The answer is absolutely yes. And anyone schooled in the Laws of Armed Conflict should know that. The fact that this is even being raised as a question is a sign that something fishy is going on.
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Not every intrusion into U.S. military networks is necessarily an act of war, cautioned the STRATCOM official. “You will hear people new to this discussion a lot using the word ‘attack’ interchangeable with ‘espionage,’” he said.
Espionage generally is a crime punishable by jail – but in the cyber world couldn’t intensive spying be an enabler of physical combat? When do “normal” cyber operations conducted in peace-time cross the line – and where is the line?
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Right attack and espionage are different. And they are still different in the "cyber world." Intensive spying in the "real world" and by other means could also be an indicator of an impending attack...but it might not be either. More evidence would be needed to be able to invoke the Article 51 right of self defense, in this case "anticipatory self defense." Again, "where is the line?" The line is where it has always been--i.e. physical damage or destruction of property, injury or loss of life is required before an act is/should be considered an "armed attack" that warrants a physical force reply in self defense. In the case of "anticipatory self defense," something more than spying, intensive or not, would be required. This constant trope of a "brave new world" where we don't know where the lines are is both disingenuous and dangerous.
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